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RECONVERSION IN MISSOURI
RECONVERSION IN MISSOURI
By ALBERT CHANDLER*
Few provisions in wills are more common or troublesome than a
direction to executors to "sell my real estate and divide the proceeds
among my children."
Though the heirs and sometimes their creditors or assigns can prevent
a sale under rules obtaining generally,' there is such diversity among
details in different states that we shall confine our discussion to the
numerous Missouri cases in hopes of presenting the matter in a practical
way here. Under such wills our courts have been called on to decide
questions involving insurance, partition, mortgages, attachments and
execution sales, ejectment, executors' commissions, as we shall see, and
to sound the gamut of family controversy.
On the threshold it may be well to suggest that in the examination of
all the cases there is one touchstone which is at least helpful in solving
any of the problems here involved. That is to ask, "Where was the
title to this land the day after the testator died ?" A devise of land to
the executor to sell passes title to him; but where he is only directed to
sell, the land will descend to the heirs subject to a naked power.2 The
title must always be somewhere, and the heirs can only be disinherited
by an express devise or necessary implication, 3 These matters will be
discussed further later on.
One other preliminary caution: it is always to be remembered that
under such wills equitable conversion and reconversion are fictions, use-
ful in their way as are other fictions of the law, but that land is always
in fact land.4 Confusing the fiction with the fact has sometimes re-
sulted in an "irreconcilability on principle," as suggested by Judge Elli-
sons who went on to state that "the authorities bring us to this: that land
*St. Louis Bar.
113 CoaRus Juais 885 et seq.; 2 WOERNER AM. LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3 Ed.)
sec. 342; 13 COL. LAw REv. 369; HARVARD LAW Rav. Vol. 18, pp. 1 and 83; Vol.
19, p. 81; Vol. 21, pp. 288 and 630; Vol. 22, p. 451; 14 MIcH. LAW REv. 252;
LANGoELL, BuiF. SU MmARY OF EQ. JUR. 260.
'Simpson v. Erisner, 155 Mo. 165; Barnard v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209; Turner
v. Hine, 297 Mo. 153; Wyatt v. Stillman Institute, 303 Mo. 94; Hobbs v. Yeager
(Mo.) 263 S. W. 225; Compton v. McMahan, 19 Mo. App. 1. c. 498; Re Ricken-
baugh, 42 Mo. App. 328; Coil v. Continental Insurance Co., 169 Mo. App. 636.
'Eneberg v. Carter 98 Mo. 647; DeLashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 436; Wyatt
v. Stillman Institute, 303 Mo. 94.
'Turner v. Hine, 297 Mo. 153; Nall v. Nal, 243 Mo. 247; Griffith v. Witten,
252 Mo. 627; Re O'Bannon's Estate, 142 Mo. App. 268; Coil v. Continental In-
surance Co., 169 Mo. App. 636.
'Compton v. McMahan (1885), 19 Mo. App. 1. c. 499.
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directed to be sold merely, does not go to the executor, but to the heir
subject to the naked power of sale; that the land directed to be sold is
to be deemed money, and as such does go to the executor." We shall
find this confusion of fact and fiction in several other opinions which do
not seem to have been shot through with the incandescence of meditation.
I.
DEFINITIONS
Equitable conversion, under such wills as we are considering, is "a
fictional or constructive alteration of the nature of the land by which
it is to be considered as personalty and dealt with as such. This legal
fiction was invented to protect the beneficiaries" and sustain and carry
out the intention of a testator . . . . The principle upon which it is
founded is that a court of equity, which regards the substance and not
the mere form of an instrument, will consider things agreed upon or di-
rected to be done as having been done, where nothing has intervened
which ought to prevent a performance," Turner v. Hine, supra. And
the court goes on to explain that the doctrine is applied here only in
its constructive sense, not in its fullness. It is therefore to be dis-
tinguished from the early cases where a house built on land of another
either by mistake 7 or by agreement" remains the personal property of
the builder, and such recent examples as where a will devised land to a
charity, the testatrix was thereafter declared insane, her guardian sold
the land for reinvestment, and on her death the devise was held not to
have lapsed or been revoked but the proceeds were awarded to the charity
in lieu of the land.0
Reconversion is a doctrine that "has been evolved from and is of
necessity incidental to that of conversion, and under it the legatees are
authorized during the constructive status of the property to elect whether
they will take the land rather than the proceeds arising from the sale."10
This doctrine is as "thoroughly grounded in the law as the doctrine of
conversion. In other words, whilst the words of a will may in legal
effect convert land into money, yet subsequent acts of the beneficiaries
may reconvert the subject into land."' ' Their right to elect to take the
land unsold is a reasonable exercise of the fundamental idea of prop-
' "The executor does not belong to that class of persons to whom the right to
invoke the doctrine of equitable conversion is available," Re O'Bannon's Estate,
142 Mo. App. 268.
'Lowenberg v. Bernd, 47 Mo. 297. 'Brown v. Turner, 113 Mo. 27.
'National Board v. Fry, 293 Mo. 399.
" Turner v. Hine, 297 Mo. 153, 248 S. W. 933.
'Nall v. Nall, 243 Mo. 247.
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erty, to make any lawful use of one's own; and a reconversion will re-
sult also where the purpose of the conversion fails, whether because im-
possible, unlawful, or, sometimes, inexpedient the fiction failing with the
failure of its reason. 12 An election to reconvert may be made by the
court acting for beneficiaries who are not sui juris,'3 or by persons who
have succeeded to the rights of beneficiaries either by voluntary con-
veyance"4 or by judicial process.' 5 But here we enter upon debatable
ground,16 as we shall see.
II.
THE WILLS CONSTRUED
In the following cases it was held that, under the wills there involved,
conveyances by one or more of the heirs or devisees passed title to their
grantees without any deed from the executor or trustee as such.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES BY BENEFICIARY
"My executors shall sell, at private or public sale, all my property, both
real and personal, as soon after my decease as they shall deem most
expedient and for the best interest of my estate"-proceeds to widow
for life, remainder to children. Held, a deed after final settlement by
the widow alone, of two executors, with no express reference to the
power, conveyed her life interest, but that only.'
7
Where a will devised property to the widow during life or widow-
De Lashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 436.
" Griffith v. Witten, 252 Mo. 627.
" Turner v. Hine, supra; Simpson v. Erisner, 155 Mo. 165; Williams v. Lob-
ban, 206 Mo. 399; Hobbs v. Yeager (Mo.) 263 S. W. 225.
", Eneberg v. Carter, 98 Mo. 647; Williams v. Lobban, supra.
" Compton v. McMahan, 19 Mo. App. 494; Llewellyn v. Llewellyn, 122 Mo.
App. 467; Morris v. Stephenson, 128 Mo. App. 338.
1 Little v. Addington (1875) 59 Mo. 275. This was in accordance with the
rule laid down by Judge Bliss in Pease v. Pilot Knob Iron Company, 49 Mo. 124,
that in arriving at the intention of the grantor, "if the instrument would be
wholly inoperative unless taken as an execution of the power, the maker wiil
be considered as having intended to execute it, although no reference to the
power is made; but if there be any legal interst [i. e. of the grantor] on which
the deed can attach, it will not execute the power." Compare two cases arising
under the same will, where one deed was held to convey only a life estate, and
the other was an exercise of the power; Owen v. Switzer, 51 Mo. 322 and Owen
v. Ellis, 64 Mo. 77, both discussed in Campbell v. Johnson, 65 Mo. 439, where
the presumption is introduced that a substantial consideration is a circumstance
from which to infer an intention to convey the whole title.
Where the trustee has active duties, possession and control of real estate, so
that the use will not be executed, a deed by the beneficiaries-who had no
present right to possession-conferred none on their grantee, but did transfer
such rights to distribution as they had; Simpson v. Erisner (1899), 155 Mo.,
1. c. 165.
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hood, then to be sold and the proceeds divided among the children, a
purchaser from the widow and children was held to have acquired the
property free from the power and was granted an injunction against a
sale under the power. Williants v. Lobban.8
Under substantially the same testamentary provision, mortgages by
the several heirs were upheld, as an election to take the land instead of
the proceeds. Nail v. Nail. 9
Again under a substantially identical provision, quit claim deeds were
held to convey the interests of those heirs who executed them. The
court said that the doctrine of conversion and reconversion "being for
the sole benefit of the persons to whom the proceeds of the sale of the
land are to be paid, they are in fact the owners of the property, and
may, being sui juris, contract concerning it as they may deem proper."
Turner v. Hine. 20
Where a will directed the executor to rent certain lands until debts,
etc., could be paid, then sell them and divide the proceeds, simple quit-
claim deeds by certain residuary legatees, and other quitclaims ex-
pressed to release the interest of certain others as heirs, were alike held
to convey their respective interests. Hobbs v. Yeager.2 1
INVOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE OF BENEFICIARY'S
INTEREST
Under the following testamentary provisions the interests of bene-
ficiaries were transferred, wholly or in part, to creditors or others by
judicial proceedings, without a deed from the executor.
"Dispose of all my real estate as soon as it can be done without loss
to my estate . . . . to be equally divided between my children." Ele-
berg v. Carter.22 A creditor properly sold out the interest of one heir
on execution, the land descending to the heirs only subjeqt to the power.
The court says, "Did the clause of the will in controversy operate of its
own force and, without action on the part of the executor, to convert
the land into money, and thus place it beyond the lien of the judgment
and the execution issued to enforce it? I am not of the opinion it did,
and for these reasons: (1). It is a well known maxim, that an heir at
law can only be disinherited by express devise or necessary implication,
and that implication is defined to be such a strong probability that an in-
tention to the contrary cannot be presumed. (2). And his title cannot
be defeated unless there was a disposition of the subject to some other
person capable of taking."
' (1907) 206 Mo. 399. "Supra, footnote 11.
"Supra, footnote 10. = (1924), (Mo.) 263 S. W. 225.
' (1889) 98 Mo. 647.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/2
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Unsold lands given "to my executors in trust to be by them held, im-
proved, leased, sold or otherwise disposed of as to them may seem best
for the use and benefit of my children in equal shares," were partitioned,
after final settlement, at the suit of some of the heirs. Donaldson v.
Allen.
2
3
Under similar provisions, the Courts of Appeals appear to depart
somewhat from the course of the Supreme Court. "My executor shall
as soon as it would be profitable and convenient, sell my real estate at
such times and on such terms as he may deem best and proper, and
divide the moneys among my children"; Compton v. McMahan.24 It
was held that a sheriff's deed passed a title to the land "extinguishable by
an execution of the power" by the executor, when the money received
by the executor was held to go to the child "as legatee under the will
and not as heir" so that the execution purchaser of the land of the heir
"was not entitled to the personal interest of the legatee."2
Lands were to "be sold at private sale by my executor for the best
price obtainable and the proceeds . . . . divided equally between my
children," Morris v. Stephenson.21 Purchasers of the interest of one
child on execution sale were held not entitled to rents between the date
of their purchase and a sale by the executor, and to have "got no interest
in the estate by virtue of their sheriff's deed," on the theory that the
land was converted by the will into personal property belonging to the
executor and not to the heirs.
27
TIME FOR EXECUTING POWER OF SALE
BEFORE LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. It was early held that before pro-
bate of the will the executor's deed would be effective where the will,
which speaks from the testator's death, gave the executor a power of
sale. Wilson v. Wilson.
28
In a recent fraud case a married woman, then unable to serve under
the statute, was named as executrix but never qualified. She induced a
foreclosure and the court "hold her as having sold it and treat her as
" 182 Mo. 626. Partition was held appropriate in setting aside a fraudulent
sale by the executor, Barnard v. Keathley (1910), 230 Mo. 209; also in Nall v.
Nall (1912), 243 Mo. 247. See Llewellyn v. Llewellyn, (1906), 122 Mo. App.
467, where it was held the proceeds of a partition sale would go to the testa-
mentary trustee.
(1885), 19 Mo. App. 494.
The distinction between the interest descending to an heir and that coming
by purchase to one as legatee is observed also in Dwyer's Estate (1921) (Mo.
App.), 231 S. W. 672.
(I1907), 128 Mo. App. 338.
A similar decision with respect to intermediate rents is Williams v. Williams(1910), 145 Mo. App. 382. " (1873), 54 Mo. 213.
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having the purchase money in her hands as a trust fund for the pur-
pose of executing the trust." Carr v. Burr.Y
And the Court of Appeals also said, perhaps obiter, that the executors
"may sell the land although they refuse the administration." Compton
v. McMahan."
TO BE EXERCISED BEFORE ADMINISTRATION PERIOD
EXPIRES
Where the executors were directed to "sell at private or public sale
as soon after my decease as they shall deem most expedient and for the
best interest of my estate, and the proceeds to be used or applied in such
manner as my executors shall think best," a deed made after final set-
tlement in the probate court was held to convey only the individual
interest of the grantor and not to exercise the power, distinguishing
Hazel v. Hagan?' The court says, "The selling is to be done by the
executors and the proceeds used and applied by them in such manner as
they, the executors, should deem best. This entirely rebuts any pre-
sumption of a personal trust to be executed after they or either of them
had ceased to act officially." Littleton v. Addington.-2
The rule is stated in Donaldson v. Allen. 3 "If the will expressly or
absolutely directs the executor to sell the real estate without vesting any
discretion in the executor, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of
debts or to distribute them, then the power adheres to the office of
executor and is not personal, and must be exercised during the con-
tinuance of the executorship, for in such cases the proceeds of the real
estate become personal assets of the estate and are a proper subject of
administration and distribution by the Probate Court."
Recently the Supreme Court dealt with a will giving the residue to
the widow for life; at her death, or earlier at her direction, the executor
was directed to sell on such terms as he deemed best and give the pro-
ceeds to a certain charity. The executor made final settlement without
having sold the land; the widow died; the circuit court appointed a suc-
cessor-trustee to sell the land for the charity. The court held, "In in-
vesting the executor with a power of sale, the will in this case did not
create a personal trust. The power conferred is one that adheres to
the office of executor and must be exercised during the continuance of
the executorship . . . . consequently, the administration is still pending
in the probate court. And that court, and that court alone, is vested
with jurisdiction to fill the vacancy." Wyatt v. Stillman Institute. 3
' (1922), 294 Mo. 673, 243 S. W. 98. " (1885) 19 Mo. App., 1. c. 509.
" 47 Mo. 277. '2 (1875), 59 Mo., 1. c. 279. See also note 17, supra.
' (1904), 182 Mo., 1. c. 647. "' (1924), 303 Mo. 94, 26 S. W. 73.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/2
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In a still more recent case, a trust company, with power of sale as
executor, had failed to sell the land for some nineteen years. The Su-
preme Court held, that "the executor ought to have sold the real estate
within the time of administration, two years, as then fixed by law, unless
the time of closing the estate was extended for good reasons by the
probate court . ... This estate should be fully and finally closed, as
contemplated by the will of testator, and respondent should be held
for all remiss conduct during the unnecessary years of its futile admin-
istration." Re McElevey's Estate, Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
Burke.3 5
POWER CONTINUING AFTER FINAL SETTLEMENT
Where the power of the executor is coupled with a discretion, it is per-
sonal and not official, and survives the final settlement; but it is not per-
petual, and the donee is subject to the control of a court of equity.
Donaldson v. Allen.38 As this article is a discussion of reconversion, it
may seem beside the mark to examine cases where the power of sale
was exercised and no reconversion took place. But it will be found
that a principle controlling many of these cases is the same principle
that distinguishes between cases where reconversion is admissible and
those where it is not open to the heirs. The beneficiaries cannot defeat
the purposes of an active discretionary trust by electing to reconvert or
otherwise, as we shall see. In deciding whether the sale can be made
by a substitute, appointed either by the Circuit or the Probate Court,
light has been thrown upon the right of beneficiaries to wind up a trust
themselves.
WHETHER SALE BY APPOINTEE OR A SUBSTITUTE
The distinction sometimes involved above, between a personal trust
and a power attached to the office of executor, reappears in some of the
cases below, dealing with execution of the power of sale by the ap-
pointee or by a substitute, and will involve a discussion of the juris-
dictional boundary line between the Circuit and Probate Courts under
these wills.
Section 132 R. S. 1919 provides that "the sale and conveyance of real
estate under a will shall be made by the acting executor or administrator
(1924), 305 Mo. 224, 266 S. W. 123.
"(1904), 182 Mo. 626. Compare De Lashmutt v. Teetor (1914), 261 Mo. 436,
where a trust created in another state evidently because of inability of foreign
executors as such to act here, was held to die with the power of the foreign
executors to receive the proceeds of a sale. Upon final settlement, therefore,
the land vested in the heirs no longer subject to a power.
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with the will annexed, if no other person be appointed by the will for
that purpose, or if such person fail or refuse to perform the trust."
With only slight verbal differences, this has been the law for over a
hundred years. See sec. 25 of an act approved January 12, 1822, Terri-
torial Laws.3 7
An early case deals with both a vicarious exercise of the power, and a
conflict in jurisdiction between the two courts, more clearly than these
matters have been discussed in some of the later opinions.
A will directed the executor to sell land after the widow's death and
then divide the proceeds among the children; the executor having re-
fused to qualify, the Public Administrator took charge c.t.a.; after the
widow's death he advertised and sold the land and accepted part pur-
chase price and then refused to complete the sale. It was sought in the
County Court-then having probate jurisdiction-to compel him to pro-
ceed. But the Supreme Court held that although the court having pro-
bate jurisdiction has control over sales under the statute, here the sale
was under the will, executing a testamentary power, and relief must be
sought in equity. Coil v. Pitman's Admninistrator2a8 Judge Wagner
wrote the opinion, holding that "the administrator with the will an-
nexed was the proper person to make the sale and execute the trust,"
under the statute above noticed (then Wagn. Stat. 93 No. 1). But to
what court he is amenable in so acting is not settled by this statute, but
by other legislation and general principles. In ordinary course, acting
under the court having probate jurisdiction, the representative selling
land must have it "appraised; he must advertise in a certain way before
the sale takes place; the sale must be had at a certain time; the property
must bring a certain amount, and there must be a report and approval to
render it valid. . . .But in the case we are considering the specific
power to sell is conferred by the will, and does not exist in consequence
of any statutory law. The administrator acted independently of the
County Court. He was not amenable to it for the performance of any
duty respecting the sale; and the manner, time, price, place, etc., were
all matters resting in his sound discretion. He was not required to
make any report or settlement with the County Court in reference to his
action; in fact, the sale had nothing to do with anything relating to the
administration. The will gave the power of attorney to sell for a speci-
fied object not connected with anything touching the administration; and
because the statute, in this instance, designated the administrator as the
proper person to execute the power, it does not follow therefore that
the County Court shall assume jurisdiction over the subject matter."
' Vol. 1, p. 925. "8 (1870), 46 Mo. 51.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/2
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We have noticed above, in discussing another matter, the case of
Simpson v. Erisner.3 9 Here the will imposed active duties of manage-
ment upon trustees, who were also executors. Both trustees resigned.
The Probate Court appointed an administrator c. t. a. It was held
that the legal title was in trustees, who must yet be appointed, to carry
out the trust. The will differed from the stereotyped form we have
found in most of the other cases.
The question of vicarious exercise of the power, as well as that of
jurisdiction, is crucial in cases dealing with liability on the adminis-
trator's bond. A will directed land to be sold by executors, the proceeds
loaned, the interest used to educate children, and at the widow's death
the principal to be divided among the children. Letters testamentary
having been revoked, a public administrator took charge, received the
proceeds of lands already sold, and sold other lands. His authority
having been revoked, his successor sued on his bond for the balance on
hand, as assets for which his sureties were liable. It was held that
"the power of sale given by the will here being absolute and peremptory,
is annexed to and follows the office of executor, and survives by virtue
of our statute to the acting administrator with the will annexed"; the
land was converted "if not from the death of testator, at least from the
date of sale"; he must therefore account as administrator and not as
trustee. Francisco v. Wingfield."
Where the real estate was given "to my executors in trust," but with
such active duties that it was a personal trust, i. e., not attached to the
office of executor, it survived the final settlement. The Circuit Court
appointed a receiver to sell and to wind up the trust. The Supreme
Court said, "There was no apparent necessity for the removal of the
trustees and appointment of a receiver, but as this involved only a ques-
tion of which should earn the commission and there has arisen bitter-
ness among the beneficiaries, it cannot be said the trial court abused its
discretion." Donaldson v. Allen."
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held void a sale of land made by
an administrator c. t. a. under such a will as we are considering, arguing
that though the executor named had refused to act, the power did not
pass, because "his duties as executor and trustee are wholly distinct.
As executor he would have nothing to do with the land. Land is not a
testamentary matter," and therefore a successor should have been
sought in the circuit Court. Cornpton v. McMahan.42 This case has
been cited often in the briefs of counsel, appearing in our reports; it
'155 Mo. 165.
" 182 Mo., 1. c. 649. " 161 Mo., 1. c. 560, 561.
" 19 Mo. App., 1. c. 509.
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has not been often referred to by the Supreme Court, and never on this
point.
Without noticing the case above, the Kansas City Court of Appeals
said later that "Nothing is better established than this principle that
money directed to be employed in the purchase of land and land directed
to be sold and turned into money are to be considered as that species of
property into which they are directed to be converted. And it may be
stated as a fixed rule that under a direction of this character the executor
does not become a mere trustee of the moneys received by him from the
sale of the lands, but takes them in his capacity of executor." Re
Branch Estate.43
Later on, however, the author of the opinion in Compton v. McMahan
referred to it in another opinion which adds no light; under such a will
he holds that on a policy of fire insurance issued to the deceased, his
executors and assigns, the executor is the proper party to sue; then the
opinion runs on obiter to say he would sue as trustee, and that a judg-
ment collected would not be assets of the estate though "of course" sub-
ject to the decedent's debts. Coil v. Continental Insurance Co.44
ELECTION TO RECONVERT
We come now to the meat of the matter: under what testamentary
provisions it is possible for the beneficiaries to reconvert so as to take
the land and defeat the power of sale, and how that right is to be
exercised.
We have referred above to the provisions of the will in Simpson v.
Erisner,45 and the construction thereof as creating an active discretionary
trust which would not be executed by vesting title in the heirs. The
land was devised to the executors, to rent, repair and control, to sup-
port his widow and educate his children, and finally to divide. There it
was held that the beneficiaries could not prevent a sale, nor could their
assignee to whom all had conveyed their interests.
The same result was reached in Wyatt v. Stillman Institute,40 but by a
somewhat different line of reasoning. The proceeds of a sale of the
residuary estate were to be given to the Institute for educational pur-
poses; if the executor could not act, the Institute was to choose a suc-
cessor. The Institute elected to take the land unsold. The court held
that there was no devise of the property, the Institute was given money,
and "land was merely the source from which the money was to be ob-
tained"; only those having the exclusive beneficial interest can elect to
(1907), 123 Mo. App., 1. c. 579.
"(1913), 169 Mo. App. 636, 155 S. W. 872.
303 Mo. 94, 260 S. W. 73. 155 Mo. 165.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/2
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reconvert; the Institute had no such interest; the gift was to a charitable
use, and of all the proceeds, not merely the rents and profits. To take
the land was held to be inconsistent with the gift, and for both the
foregoing reasons the election was ineffectual.
It will have been observed that the wills discussed in both these cases
were quite different from the testamentary clause with which we begin
this article. It is only in such exceptional cases that reconversion is not
open to the beneficiaries.
4 7
The courts have discussed the question whether an election to recon-
vert must be unanimous, or whether less than all the beneficiaries may
defeat the power of sale. It is agreed that in all ordinary cases the
election must be by all the beneficiaries, and only where one is given a
stated sum which the others will pay, or under other such circum-
stances he cannot possibly be injured by reconversion by the others, will
less than unanimous consent suffice.4 8  But a court may elect for those
not sui juris, Griffith v. Witten,49 acting for their best interest, as it may
also terminate the trust on a proper showing. Donaldson v. Allen.50
"The election need not be simultaneous, Williams v. Lobban50a and
may take place at any time before the actual conversion of the land into
money by a sale. 51
The election may be shown by executing deeds 52 to the land, or mort-
gages,"3 or by pleadings filed ;54 and the execution of the use will be
tantamount to the same thing."
In one case the difficulty of valuing the interest of one heir was
deemed an insuperable obstacle to reconversion by the others; Turner v.
Hine.5sa But the Kansas City Court of Appeals saw no such difficulty
in valuing the land as a basis for compensating the trustee. Gilbreath
v. Cosgrove.56
EFFECT OF RECONVERSION
EXECUTOR'S COMMISSIONS. The question of jurisdiction controlled
" See discussion of Williams v. Lobban in the recent case of McElevey's Es-
tate, 305 Mo. 244; 266 S. W., 1. c. 124, 125.
'Turner v. Hine (1923), 297 Mo. 153; 248 S. W. 933; Williams v. Lobban,
206 Mo., 399; Galbreath v. Cosgrove, 193 Mo. App. 419; Wyatt v. Stillman Insti-
tute, supra.
4 (1913), 252 Mo. 627. 1904. 182 Mo. 626.
"a 206 Mo., I. c. 414. See also Nall v. Nall, 243 Mo. 247, separate mortgages
given at different times.
"Griffith v. Witten and Williams v. Lobban, supra.
"Williams v. Lobban, 206 Mo. 399. "' Nall v. Nall, 243 Mo. 247.
" Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626; Nal v. Nall, supra; Galbreath v. Cosgrove,
193 Mo. App. 419.
"De Lashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 436. "a Note 10 supra.
"(1916), 193 Mo. App. 119.
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in disposing of the first case involving a claim to commissions on the
proceeds of such a testamentary sale of real estate. "The power given
the executor to sell the land was not a power conferred upon him in his
capacity as executor . . . The subject matter of the controversy be-
tween the trustee and the devisees in respect to the commissions claimed
by the former for services rendered in the execution of the trust is
clearly within the jurisdiction of the circuit court and without that of
the Probate Court." The latter had disallowed commissions charged in
the final settlement, and this was affirmed. Re Rickenbaugh.7
In O'Bannon's Estate,58 though the will directed the executor to sell
land and pay off the distributees "in money," the heirs voluntarily par-
titioned lands of the agreed value of $25,000, and the executor claimed
a commission on their valuation. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held
that, however it might have been converted by the will, the land was re-
converted by election of the heirs and "the court was right in disallow-
ing the claim for a commission."
Without citing its decision in this case, the same court reached the
opposite result in Gilbreath v. Cosgrove." Here the will directed the
executor to sell, pay the widow $8000, and divide the balance. The
court enjoined a sale on condition that the heirs pay off the widow and
a commission to the executor.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals followed the O'Bannon Case in Re
Dwyer's Estate,60 where the heirs had voluntarily partitioned, holding
the executor was not entitled to a commission, setting out the statute
R. S. 1919, sec. 220, which allows "as full compensation for their
services and trouble a commission of five per cent on personal property
and on money arising from the sale of real estate."
The latter court makes an effort to reconcile the O'Bannon and Gil-
breath cases, on the theory that where there is a conversion, a commis-
sion may be due; where there is no conversion, no commission is due.
But this rather begs the question as to what will be considered a con-
version, whether it be actual or constructive. It is submitted that the
Gilbreath case cannot be reconciled with the decision of the Supreme
Court in Williams v. Lobban,16 holding that a purchaser from the heirs
"is entitled to the land, and is not bound to submit to a sale of the prop-
erty and attendant expenses and costs thereof, and the court below was
right in granting him a perpetual injunction to prevent the sale," with-
out any such onerous condition requiring commissions to be first paid
as in the Gilbreath case.
(1890), 42 Mo. App. 328. (1910), 142 Mo. App. 268.(1916), 193 Mo. App. 419. e' (1921), 231 S. W. 672.
' (1907), 206 Mo. 399.
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RECONVERSION IN MISSOURI
The Supreme Court had theretofore upheld an exclusion of execu-
tors from such commissions, where they did not make the sale, in Don-
aldson v. Allen:6 2 "Appointment of a receiver involved only a question
of which should earn the commission and . . . . it cannot be said the
trial court abused its discretion."
MANAGEMENT OF LAND. Under a will devising land to trustees, with
power to sell for the best interests of the estate and pay over the pro-
ceeds to foreign executors, to be by them divided among beneficiarls,
the Supreme Court held the trustees had only a naked power; "they have
under the provisions of the will no right to the possession, direction or
management of the land in any respect whatever," De Lashinutt v.
Teetor.63
Under a similar power the Supreme Court recently held that the
executor takes "exactly that quantity of interest which the purposes of
the trust require . . . . The will did not impose on the executor any
duty involving possession, control or management of the testator's land;
it merely directed him to sell it. This naked power he could as ef-
fectively exercise without the fee as with it. It follows that he did not
take the fee by implication." Wyatt v. Stillnan Institute.
64
It is the business of the heirs or distributees, not of the executor, to
keep the property insured. 5
Questions involving rents are far from settled. Thus in the Stillnan
Institute case, where there was no devise of the land to anybody, and
where we have just seen that the executor had a naked power of sale
without control or management of the property, it was held that the
title vested in the heirs in trust for the sole beneficiary, which would be
entitled to the proceeds of a sale together with the rents and profits.
Who should collect the rents is not stated; doubtless a receiver might be
appointed as in Donaldson v. Allen. 66
Of course there is no trouble about this where the heirs and the dis-
tributees are the same persons, and title vests in them subject to a naked
power of sale. Our examination of the wills construed, supra, has
shown that most of them fall into this class. The right to the rents
seems dependent upon the date and duration of the supposititious conver-
sion of the land into personalty. While there was some hesitation about
fixing the date, it is perhaps settled that the conversion will be deemed to
take place with the testator's death, in cases where there is a peremptory
(1902), 182 Mo., I. c. 649. ' (1914), 261 Mo. 436, 169 S. W. 34.
"(1923), 303 Mo. 94, 260 S. W. 73.
"Coil v. Continental Insurance Co. (1913), 169 Mo. App. 636.
"182 Mo. 626.
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direction to sell,67 but where the power to sell is dependent on a condition
subsequent, 68 or the exercise of a discretion, 69 there will be no fictional
conversion but the land will be deemed land until the sale and actual
conversion into money.70  Even in the first group of peremptory direc-
tions to sell, will be found cases holding title to remain in the heirs
awaiting the actual conversion. 71 An examination of the cases in the
notes below will disclose considerable speculation upon the date of con-
version, not always necessary to the decisions, with resulting confusion.
Where it is held that the land had been converted into personalty, it has
followed that rents belonged to the executor to be accounted for in his
settlements, Williams v. Williams.
7 2
The same principles should determine whether a creditor of an heir,
levying on his interest in the land, can acquire the same on an execution
sale. Where land is only the source from which money is to come, to
be distributed by the executor, it is an asset of the estate rather than of
the heir or distributee.7 ' But where the land vests in the heir subject
to a naked power of sale7 4 or where there has been a reconversion by
which the heirs or distributees have elected to take the land as land, a
levy on the interest of the heir will pass to the execution purchaser such
real property as the heir has therein.7 5  We have seen above that the
same principles determine what passes by a voluntary conveyance.76
Relief against fraud or misconduct of the trustee has been afforded
even though it was necessary to bend the doctrines of conversion and
reconversion to the pecular circumstances of the cases.77
"Re McElevey's Estate, Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Burke (1924), 305
Mo. 244; Wyatt v. Stillman Institute (1923), 303 Mo. 94; 260 S. W. 73. But
even here, where the will intends to convert land into personalty, it has been
held that there may be no intention to vest the title to the land in the executor,
and that partition will lie, Barnard v. Keathley (1910), 230 Mo. 209; and that it
is for the heirs to insure, Coil v. Continental Insurance Co. (1913), 169 Mo. App.
636.
Re Rickenbaugh (1890), 42 Mo. App. 328.
Simpson v. Erisner (1899), 155 Mo. 165; De Lashmutt v. Teetor (1914),
261 Mo. 436.
"°Hobbs v. Yeager (1924) (Mo.) 263 S. W. 225; Turner v. Hine (1923), 297
Mo. 153; 248 S. W. 933; Griffith v. Witten (1913), 252 Mo. 627.7 Williams v. Lobban (1907), 206 Mo. 399.
' 145 Mo. App. 382. See also Morris v. Stephenson (1907), 128 Mo. App. 338.
'Wyatt v. Stillman Institute (1923), 303 Mo. 94; Morris v. Stephenson (1907),
128 Mo. App. 338.7
' Eneberg v. Carter (1889), 98 Mo. 647.
"Compton v. McMahan (1885), 19 Mo. App. 494. See discussion of involun-
tary conveyances above.7 Compare Simpson v. Erisner (1899), 155 Mo. 157 with Hobbs v. Yeager
(1924) (Mo.), 263 S. W. 225.
' Barnard v. Keathley (1910), 230 Mo. 209; Carr v. Barr (1922), 294 Mo.
673; Re McElevey's Estate, Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Burke (1924), 305
Mo. 244.
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